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1. Introduction 
Generally, if a user wants to use numerous different network services, he 
must register himself to every service providing server. It is extremely hard for 
users to remember these different identities and passwords. In order to resolve this 
problem, various multi-server authentication protocols have been proposed. 
Recently, Li et al. [1] proposed an authentication protocol for multi-server 
environments and claimed their protocol could withstand various attacks. In this 
paper we will show Tsaur et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the password guessing 
attack and a masquerade attack. 
The organization of the letter is sketched as follows. The Section 2 gives a 
brief review of Li et al.’s protocol. The weanesses of Li et al.’s protocol are 
shown in Section 3. Finally, we give some conclusions in Section 4. 
2. Li et al.’s protocol 
Li et al.’s protocol involves three participants, i.e.,the user( iU ), the service 
provider server ( jS ) and the control server (CS ). It is as summed that CS  is a 
trusted party responsible for the registration and authentication of the iU  and 
jS . CS chooses the master secret key x and a secret number y. When jS  register 
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himself with CS use his identity jSID , the control server CS  computes 
( || )jh SID y  and ( || )h x y , then CS shares ( || )jh SID y  and ( || )h x y  with jS . 
As shown in Fig. 1.[1], Li et al.’s protocol consists of three phases: Registration 
phase, Log-in and Authentication and session key agreement phase. 
2.1. Registration phase 
Suppose that user iU  want to get service granted from the server jS . iU  
first chooses his/her identity iID , password iP  and a random number b , and 
then sends iID  and ( || )i iA h b P= to CS  via a secure channel. CS  will 
perform the following steps:  
1) CS  computes ( || )i iB h ID x= , ( || ( ) || )i i iC h ID h y A= , 
( || )i i i iD B h ID A= ⊕  and ( || )i iD B h y x= ⊕ . Then  
2) CS  stores , , , ( )i i iC D E h ⋅  and ( )h y  to the memory of a smart card and 
issue this smart card to iU . 
3) After receiving the smart card, iU  inputs b  into it and finishes the 
registration. 
2.2. Login phase 
Once the user iU  wants to login to the server jS , he will perform the 
following login steps. 
1) The user iU  inputs his identity iID  and the password iP  into the 
terminal. The smart card computes ( || )i iA h b P=  and ( || ( ) || )i i iC h ID h y A′ = . 
Then the smart card checks whether iC  and iC′  are equal. If they are not equal, 
the smart card stops the session. 
2) The smart card generates a random number 1iN , computes 
( || )i i i iB D h ID A= ⊕ , 1( )i iF h y N= ⊕ , 1( ( ) || | )|i jij i N SP E h h y ID= ⊕ , 
1( || || )i i i i iCID A h B F N= ⊕  and 1( || || )i i i iG h B A N= . At last, the smart card 
sends 1 ( , , , )i i ij iM F G P CID=  to jS . 
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2.3 Authentication and session key agreement phase 
1) Upon receiving the message 1M , jS  generates a random number 2iN , 
computes 2( || )i j iK h SID y N= ⊕  and 2( ( || ) || )i iM h h x y N= . At last, jS  sends 
2 ( , , , , , , )i i ij i j i iM F G P CID SID K M=  to CS . 
2) After receiving 2M , CS  computes 2 ( || )i j iN h SID y K= ⊕  and checks 
whether iM  and 2( ( || ) || )ih h x y N  are equal. If they are not equal, CS  stops 
the session. 
3) CS  computes 1 ( )i iN h y F= ⊕ , 1 ||( ( ) || ) ( || )i ji ijB P h h y hN SID y x= ⊕ ⊕ , 
and 1( || || )i i i i iA CID h B F N= ⊕ . Then CS  checks whether iG  and 
1( || || )i i ih B A N  are equal. If they are not equal, CS  stops the session. 
4) CS  generates a random number 3iN , computes 
1 3 2( || )i i i j iQ N N h SID N= ⊕ ⊕ , 1 2 3( || ) ( )i i i i i iR h A B h N N N= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ , 
1 2 3( ( || ) || ( ))i i i i i iV h h A B h N N N= ⊕ ⊕ , 2 3 1( || || )i i i i i iT N N h A B N= ⊕ ⊕ . Then 
CS  sends 3 ( , , , )i i i iM Q R V T=  to jS . 
5) Upon receiving the message 3M , jS  computes 
1 3 2( || )i i i j iN N Q h SID N⊕ = ⊕  and 1 2 3( || ) ( )i i i i i ih A B R h N N N= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ . Then 
jS  checks whether iV  and 1 2 3( ( || ) || ( ))i i i i ih h A B h N N N⊕ ⊕  are equal. If they 
are not equal, jS  stops the session. At last, jS  sends 4 ( , )i iM V T=  to iU . 
6) Upon receiving the message 4M , iU ’s smart card computes 
2 3 1( || || )i i i i i iN N T h A B N⊕ = ⊕  and checks whether iV  and 
1 2 3( ( || ) || ( ))i i i i ih h A B h N N N⊕ ⊕  are equal. If they are not equal, iU  stops the 
session. 
Finally, the user iU , the server jS and the control server CS agree on a 
common session key as 1 2 3( ( || ) || )i i i i ih BS h A N NK N= ⊕ ⊕ . 
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Fig. 1. Work flow of Li et al.’s protocol 
3. Weaknesses of Li et al.’s protocol 
3.1. Password Guessing Attack 
Kocher et al. [2] and Messerges et al. [3] have pointed out that all existent 
smart cards are vulnerable in that the confidential information stored in the device 
could be extracted by physically monitoring its power consumption; once a card is 
lost, all secrets in it may be revealed. To evaluate the security of smart card based 
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user authentication, we assume the capabilities that an adversary A  may have 
as follows: 
1) The adversary has total control over the communication channel between 
the users and the server in the login and authentication phases. That is, A  may 
intercept, insert, delete, or modify any message in the channel. 
2) A  may (i) either steal a user's smart card and then extract the 
information from it, (ii) or obtain a user's password, (iii) but not both (i) and (ii). 
Suppose an adversary A  has stolen iU 's smart card and extracted the 
stored values , , , ( )i i iC D E h ⋅  and ( )h y , where ( || )i iA h b P= , ( || )i iB h ID x= , 
( || ( ) || )i i iC h ID h y A= , ( || )i i i iD B h ID A= ⊕  and ( || )i iD B h y x= ⊕ . Then the 
attacker A  could find the password guessing by performing the following 
procedure. 
1) A  guesses a password iP′  and a identity iID ′ . 
2) A  computes ( || )i iA h b P′ ′=  and ( || ( ) || )i i iC h ID h y A′ ′= . 
3) A  checks whether iC′  and iC  are equal. If they are equal, A  finds 
the correct password. Otherwise, A  repeats 1)-3) until finding the correct 
password. 
From the above description, we know the adversary can get the password. 
Therefore, Li et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the password guessing attack. 
3.2 Masquerade Attack 
Let tU  is a malicious user. Then he will get his secure key , , , ( )t t tC D E h ⋅  
and ( )h y , where ( || )t tA h b P= , ( || )t tB h ID x= , ( || ( ) || )t t tC h ID h y A= , 
( || )t t t tD B h ID A= ⊕  and ( || )t tD B h y x= ⊕ . Then tU  could impersonate the 
user iU  through the following steps. 
tU  generates a random number 1iN , computes ( || )t t t tB D h ID A= ⊕ , 
1( )i iF h y N= ⊕ , 1( ( ) || | )|i jij t N SP E h h y ID= ⊕ , 1( || || )i t t i iCID A h B F N= ⊕  and 
1( || || )i t t iG h B A N= . At last, the smart card sends 1 ( , , , )i i ij iM F G P CID=  to jS . 
It is easy to verify that 1 ( , , , )i i ij iM F G P CID=  could pass CS ’s verification. 
Then tU  could impersonate iU  successfully. 
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From the above description, we know  tU  could impersonate iU  
successfully. Therefore, Li et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the masquerade attack. 
3.3 Replay Attack 
The adversary A  has total control over the communication channel 
between the users and the server in the login and authentication phases. That is, 
A  may intercept, insert, delete, or modify any message in the channel. 
A  could intercept a legal message 1 ( , , , )i i ij iM F G P CID=  generated by a 
user iU . Then A  could send it to the server jS . Since 1M  is generated by 
iU , then it could pass the verification of CS  and jS .  
From the above description, we know  tU  could impersonate iU  
successfully. Therefore, Li et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the replay attack. 
4. Conclusion 
Recently, Li et al. proposed an authentication protocol for multi-server 
environments and demonstrated its immunity against various attacks. However, 
after review of their protocol and analysis of its security, three kinds of 
weaknesses are presented in different scenarios. The analyses show that the 
protocol is insecure for practical application. 
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